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Sectoral Initiatives and 
Opportunity Youth
An estimated 6.7 million 
individuals in the United States are 
between the ages of 16 and 24 and are 
not employed, not in school, and have 
not earned a postsecondary credential. 
An acronym that is applied to these 
individuals is NEET (not employed or in 
education and training). A more hopeful 
appellation is opportunity youth (OY). 
This article is based on a recent policy 
paper (Hollenbeck [2014]; see http://
research.upjohn.org/up_policypapers/18) 
that reviews policies targeted at OY and 
examines the extent to which sectoral 
initiatives, which operate on the demand 
side of the labor market, can help to 
facilitate pathways into productive 
careers.1
Sectoral Initiatives
Workforce development sectoral 
initiatives have evolved from the work 
of Michael Porter (1990, 1998, 2000) on 
the economic development advantages of 
industrial clusters. Such clusters involve 
collections of regionally based companies 
operating horizontally or vertically in 
the same industrial sector(s) in order 
to exploit localized agglomeration 
economies. These economies, or positive 
externalities, are at least threefold:
1)  Benefi ts that arise from an 
accessible labor pool with 
appropriate skills; not only do 
incumbent workers possess the 
needed skills heightened by on-the-
job training and experience, but 
training institutions in the region that 
are meeting the local demands are 
likely to offer to potential workers 
the skills training that is suitable to 
the cluster.
2) Development of supplier fi rms 
(second- and third-tier fi rms) 
that keep inputs available and 
presumably competitively priced. 
3) Network effects: proximity facilitates 
communication fl ows that may 
lead to innovation, business-to-
business transactions, and increasing 
interdependence.
Workforce development entities, 
recognizing the need for involvement 
of private sector and other employers 
in order to be successful, have formed 
partnerships with fi rms in clusters. We 
refer to these partnerships as sectoral 
initiatives. A major advantage of these 
initiatives is that the workforce systems 
develop networks with employers that 
allow them to more effectively train and 
place customers (see Conway and Giloth 
[2014]). From a workplace development 
perspective, sectoral initiatives narrow or 
bound the occupations that trainees can 
focus on, and they are a convenient venue 
from which to derive employer input into 
training delivery and job development.
An important structural element 
of workforce development sectoral 
initiatives is the intermediary that 
organizes and convenes (in person or 
virtually) the participants. In general, 
2
Employment Research APRIL 2015
employers focus on their own production 
issues (inputs, throughputs, and outputs) 
and maintain their customer base. 
Furthermore, employers are engaged 
in competition with other employers. 
Educators and workforce development 
agencies typically focus on providing 
services to customers needing skill 
training and job search assistance. Often, 
the educational and workforce agencies 
consider themselves to be in competition 
as well. An intermediary organization 
(which sometimes may come from the 
education or workforce development side 
of the market) brings together employers, 
educators, and workforce development 
agencies to identify and exploit areas 
in which collaboration among the 
entities is possible and benefi cial. 
In some instances, the collaboration 
may bring in economic development 
agencies, philanthropic organizations, 
governmental agencies, or others with an 
interest in the economic or community 
development goals of the initiative. 
On the supply side of the labor 
market, the intermediaries get involved 
in recruitment; provision of services, 
such as training; provision of or referral 
to support services, as necessary; 
placement; and follow-up assistance. On 
the demand side of the labor market, the 
intermediaries conduct job development, 
organize and communicate with the 
sectoral network of fi rms, and help them 
meet their labor market needs. 
Evidence about the Impact of Sectoral 
Initiatives on OY
Maguire et al. (2010) is usually 
considered the most rigorous evaluation 
of sectoral initiatives. This study features 
a random assignment framework for 
evaluating the net impact of sectoral 
initiatives on the employment and 
earnings of individuals at three fairly 
large, established workforce development 
programs: Wisconsin Regional Training 
Program (WRTP) in Milwaukee, Jewish 
Vocational Services (JVS-Boston), 
and Per Scholas in Brooklyn. These 
programs serve individuals of all ages 
with several different employment 
barriers, but in particular, around 30 
percent of the clients are aged 18–24. 
The WRTP program provides short-term 
preemployment training in construction, 
manufacturing, and health care; JVS-
Boston provides training in preparation 
for jobs in medical billing and 
accounting; and Per Scholas focuses on 
computer technician occupations.
Maguire et al. (2010) fi nd quite 
positive outcomes for the overall 
population of participants—annual 
earnings increases of $4,500 (about 18 
percent), more months of employment, 
higher wage rates, and a greater 
likelihood of holding jobs with benefi ts. 
Most of the positive outcomes occurred 
in the second follow-up year. For youth 
aged 18–24 in 2003, when data from all 
the sites were pooled, the statistically 
signifi cant net impacts were about $3,100 
in annual earnings in the second year, 
one month of extra employment in the 
second year, 237 hours of employment in 
the second year, 2.7 extra months in the 
fi rst year with a wage rate over $11 per 
hour, and 2.0 extra months in the second 
year with a wage rate over $11 per hour.2 
Whereas the report does not break out 
the quantitative results by site for the 
youth subgroup, the text notes that youth 
at the JVS-Boston site did particularly 
well vis-à-vis the control group. Maguire 
et al. (2010) suggest that this may have 
occurred because of particularly effective 
supports at that site.3 
Gasper and Henderson (2014) assess 
the employment and earnings outcomes 
of individuals who participated at one of 
three Career Centers in New York City. 
They also fi nd statistically signifi cant 
impacts for youth aged 18–24. The three 
sectoral initiatives are the Transportation 
Career Center, the Healthcare Career 
Center, and the Manufacturing Career 
Center. The study uses a quasi-
experimental approach that statistically 
matches individuals who received 
services from the sector-focused career 
centers to individuals who received 
services at the Workforce 1 Career 
Centers in New York City (the city’s one-
stops). The percentage of participants 
in the 18–24-year-old age range in this 
study is only about 12 percent compared 
to 30 percent in Maguire et al. (2010).
Nevertheless, Gasper and Henderson 
(2014) fi nd statistically signifi cant 
employment and earnings impacts 
for youth aged 18–24 in the fi rst year 
after program exit.4 The net impact of 
the sector-focused career centers on 
employment in the fourth quarter after 
exit was 3.8 percentage points, or about 6 
percent. This was statistically signifi cant. 
Also statistically signifi cant was the net 
impact on total earnings for the four 
quarters after exit—$3,294, a percentage 
increase of about 30 percent. In short, this 
evaluation presents quite strong evidence 
that a sectoral initiative can have positive 
employment and earnings impacts on 
young people aged 18–24. 
Policy Recommendations
Whereas the focus of the review 
paper is on the demand side of the 
labor market—that is, how workforce 
development sectoral initiatives can help 
to engage OY in employment or training 
activities—it should be noted that a root 
cause of the disengagement of many 
youth is a poor experience or preparation 
in high school. Strengthening career and 
technical education, and in particular, 
integrating work-based learning 
opportunities, may make high school 
more relevant and interesting for at-risk 
students and may stem disengagement. 
The intermediaries and workforce 
development partners in sectoral 
initiatives should ensure that partnerships 
include K–12 districts, particularly 
the career and technical education 
administrators of those districts, and 
fi rms should make an effort to serve on 
career and technical education advisory 
committees and offer internships or other 
work-based learning opportunities.
In considering the liabilities and 
needs of OY, overcoming technical or 
Sectoral initiatives are
a convenient venue from 
which to derive employer 
input into training delivery 
and job development.
A root cause of the 
disengagement of many 
youth is a poor experience or 
preparation in high school.
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employability skill defi ciencies and 
simultaneously providing means of 
support imply solutions that pair “learning 
and earning.” Apprenticeships are an 
obvious model, wherein individuals 
are employed and receiving on-the-job 
training, while also pursuing related 
academic instruction. Traditionally, 
apprentices are older than 24, but 
programs such as the Wisconsin Youth 
Apprenticeship model serve high school 
students.5 Again, this kind of program 
can engage youth who might otherwise 
fl ounder in high school and drop out.
Because members of the OY 
population are not engaged in training 
or education, outreach to these young 
people may present a challenge. As a 
consequence, it would seem incumbent 
upon workforce intermediaries or other 
workforce development agencies to 
have the capability to immediately 
assist any young person who happens 
to encounter the agency. Technology 
should be available to allow an individual 
to complete a skills and competency 
inventory and output a resume on a fl ash 
drive. Private sector employers who are 
on workforce boards or are otherwise 
involved in sectoral initiatives should 
participate in career fairs for youth, 
at which they can engage in mock 
interviews and critique the job search and 
interview skills of participants. 
Many OY have entrepreneurial skills 
that can and should be triggered. Well-
publicized competitions or mentorships 
with successful entrepreneurs are 
strategies that may capture and display 
entrepreneurial abilities. The policy 
paper cites an example in Paris, where 
an annual competition called Talent 
Revealers is staged in which the most 
successful young entrepreneur is 
recognized and given a cash prize of 
12,000 euros, which is contributed by 
companies.
As a closing note, it should be 
recognized that there is no “silver bullet” 
that solves all the issues for OY. Marginal 
progress may be the best that can be 
accomplished. Whereas some studies fi nd 
positive outcomes for some programs, 
most research on youth programs note 
that it is a hard demographic in which 
to make a lot of progress and bring 
programs to scale. One lesson that has 
emerged from the existing literature is 
that adequate planning is a necessity. A 
good example to study is the New York 
City Young Adult Sectoral Employment 
Project (see JobsFirstNYC [2014]). 
The lesson from this initiative is that 
it is best to go slowly and get potential 
intermediaries and employers together 
to jointly formulate interventions before 
actually enrolling youth. 
Notes
1. Funding for the paper was provided 
by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Pew 
Charitable Trusts. I would like to thank 
Jennifer Thornton of the Pew Charitable 
Trusts for her thoughtful guidance in 
developing the paper. The views expressed in 
that paper and in this article are solely mine 
and do not necessarily refl ect those of the 
supporting institutions.
2. The control group worked, on average, 
7.4 months of the second year and averaged 
1,095 hours for the year. The treatment group 
worked, on average, 8.4 months of the second 
years and averaged 1,332 hours of work for 
the year.
3. Maguire et al. (2010) note that there 
were no statistically signifi cant impacts at the 
WRTP or Per Scholas sites for youth, which 
means that positive results were not sizable 
enough relative to their standard errors to be 
statistically signifi cant. 
4. At fi rst blush, it appears as though the 
timing of the positive outcomes for the two 
evaluations differs. However, the difference 
is likely due to the baseline starting point. 
The Maguire et al. (2010) random assignment 
evaluation measures outcomes relative to the 
start date, whereas the Gasper and Henderson 
(2014) evaluation measures outcomes relative 
to the program’s exit date.
5. Sum et al. (2014) indicate that Georgia 
and South Carolina also have developed youth 
apprenticeship programs.
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Seth Gershenson
Did No Child Left Behind 
Affect Teacher Attendance? 
Evidence from North Carolina
Attaching incentives to students’ 
performance on standardized exams has 
the potential to alleviate the principal-
agent problem inherent in the relationship 
between stakeholders and schools, 
improve student achievement, and 
reduce the costs of public education. 
Indeed, this is the motivation behind the 
state-level consequential accountability 
policies introduced in the 1990s and the 
2001 passage of the federal No Child 
Left Behind Act (NCLB).1 The effi cacy 
of such policies is central to the current 
debate surrounding the reauthorization of 
the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act, under which NCLB was fi rst passed. 
Consequential accountability policies 
are typically associated with modest, 
statistically signifi cant increases in 
student achievement ranging from 10 
to 30 percent of a test-score standard 
deviation (Figlio and Loeb 2011). 
However, critics contend that these 
test-score gains are illusory and refl ect 
strategic responses by schools rather 
than true learning gains. Evidence of 
strategic responses to the incentives 
provided by consequential accountability 
policies runs the gamut from the 
relatively innocuous (e.g., “narrowing of 
the curriculum”) to the nefarious (e.g., 
explicit teacher cheating). As a result, the 
mechanisms through which consequential 
accountability policies affect academic 
achievement are not entirely understood, 
but they have implications for the design 
of future education policies and the 
public sector performance standards 
movement more generally. 
Increased teacher effort is one 
potential mechanism through which 
consequential accountability policies 
might improve student achievement, 
as teachers play a critical role in the 
educational process. Teacher attendance 
measures one dimension of teacher 
effort that is known to affect student 
achievement.2 Moreover, teacher 
absences are fi nancially costly and create 
negative externalities by infl uencing 
the attendance of their peers. This 
article is based on a recent Upjohn 
Institute Working Paper (Gershenson 
[2015]; see http://research.upjohn.org/
up_workingpapers/217/) that examines 
one potential mechanism through 
which consequential accountability 
policies affect student achievement by 
considering how, if at all, the threat of 
sanctions associated with failing to meet 
NCLB’s performance standards affected 
teacher absence rates in North Carolina. 
Accountability Pressure in Early Years 
of NCLB
NCLB required all schools to make 
adequate yearly progress (AYP), which 
included meeting percent profi cient, 
attendance, and test-participation 
thresholds both overall and for specifi c 
subgroups of the student population. 
Furthermore, the act mandated additional 
sanctions (e.g., restructuring and state 
takeover) on Title 1 schools that failed 
to make AYP in consecutive years. The 
subsequent discussion focuses on Title 1 
schools, as they comprise the majority of 
North Carolina’s public primary schools, 
and the threat of sanctions there was 
particularly salient.
In 2004, teachers in schools that 
failed to make AYP in 2003 (the fi rst 
year of NCLB) were under considerably 
more pressure than their counterparts in 
schools that made AYP in 2003, as the 
former were in schools at risk of failing 
to make AYP for two consecutive school 
years.3 Thus, teachers in schools that 
failed to make AYP in 2003 compose the 
treatment group, while their counterparts 
in schools that made AYP in 2003 
compose the control group. However, 
a simple comparison between the 2004 
attendance records of teachers in the 
treatment and control groups is unlikely 
to provide a valid estimate of the effect 
of failing to make AYP on teacher 
absences, as the treatment (i.e., failing 
to make AYP in 2003) was not randomly 
assigned to schools. Specifi cally, the 
schools that failed to make AYP in 2003 
might systematically differ from their 
counterparts that made AYP in 2003 in 
both observable and unobservable ways. 
Main Results
That problem can be avoided using a 
difference-in-differences (DD) strategy 
that uses data from 2003 to control for 
preexisting differences between treatment 
and control schools. The method’s name 
comes from the fact that in its simplest 
form, the DD estimate is simply the 
difference between two differences: the 
difference in average annual absences 
between treatment and control schools, 
between 2003 and 2004. Table 1 presents 
the sample averages used to compute the 
DD estimate of the effect of failing to 
make AYP on annual teacher absences. 
The DD point estimate of −1.25, which 
is strongly statistically signifi cant, 
suggests that on average teachers in 
schools that failed to make AYP in 2003 
took 1.25 fewer absences in 2004. To 
put this number in perspective, note that 
the average teacher was absent about 
8.7 times per year, so 1.25 represents a 
Table 1  Mean Annual Teacher Absences
NOTE: N = 8,080 teacher-years. The standard error of the difference-in-differences estimate of 
−1.25, which is robust to clustering at the school level, is 0.43. ***p < 0.01.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from the North Carolina Education Research Data 
Center.
Year School failed in 2003 School passed in 2003 Difference
2004 7.97 8.97 −1.00
2003 9.01 8.76 0.25
Difference −1.04 0.21 −1.25***
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14 percent decrease. The DD estimate 
remains similar in magnitude when the 
sample is restricted to teachers who did 
not change schools between 2003 and 
2004, which suggests that the effect of 
sanctions associated with failing AYP 
on teacher absences is driven by within-
teacher changes in behavior, not by 
changes in the composition of schools’ 
teaching staffs. The decrease is even 
larger among more effective teachers 
who attended selective undergraduate 
institutions and who have higher value-
added measures of effectiveness.
More sophisticated regression-based 
DD estimators that control for observed 
teacher qualifi cations, observed school 
characteristics, school fi xed effects, 
teacher fi xed effects, and school-specifi c 
time trends yield similarly sized, 
statistically signifi cant estimates ranging 
from about −1.0 to −1.6. These results 
suggest that the main results are not 
driven by changes in the student bodies 
of “treatment” schools relative to those 
of “control” schools between 2003 and 
2004. The DD estimate presented in 
Table 1 is similarly robust to the way in 
which teacher absences are measured. 
For example, the analogous DD estimate 
of the effect of accountability pressure on 
the likelihood that a teacher is absent 15 
or more times per school year is −0.03, 
which represents a 30 percent decline.
Sensitivity Analysis
The DD estimates discussed above 
are suggestive of a causal effect of 
failing AYP in 2003, and the resulting 
increase in accountability pressure, on 
teachers’ 2004 attendance. However, the 
validity of DD estimates hinges on the 
“common trends” assumption that there 
was no preexisting differential trend 
in teacher absences in treated schools 
(i.e., schools that failed AYP in 2003). 
This assumption is easily tested in an 
event-study framework using several 
years of data prior to the passage of 
NCLB. Intuitively, the event-study model 
includes placebo “treatment effects” 
of failing AYP in 2003 on absences in 
prior years. Event-study estimates, using 
data from 1997 to 2004, are depicted in 
Figure 1. The bars represent the effect of 
failing AYP in 2003 on annual teacher 
absences in each year from 1998 onward. 
If the common trends assumption 
holds—that is, there is no preexisting 
differential trend in the treated schools—
the 1998–2003 interaction terms should 
be statistically indistinguishable from 
zero. Indeed, this is exactly what we see 
in Figure 1, as each of the 95 percent 
confi dence intervals includes zero. 
However, in 2004, the year in which we 
expect to see an effect of failing AYP in 
2003, the estimated effect is about −1.10 
and statistically signifi cantly different 
from zero. This is in line with the DD 
estimates discussed above and provides 
further evidence that the DD estimate 
presented in Table 1 can be given a causal 
interpretation.
Conclusion
The estimated effect of performance 
standards on teacher absences is 
consistent with previous research on 
the malleability of teacher effort, as 
Ahn (2013) and Jacob (2013) fi nd 
evidence that teacher effort, as measured 
by teacher absences, responds to 
incentives. Moreover, the magnitudes of 
the effects discussed above are similar 
to those of the estimated effects of a 
policy change in Chicago that granted 
principals the discretion to dismiss 
probationary teachers (Jacob 2013). 
Finally, the estimates reported here likely 
underestimate the total effect of NCLB’s 
accountability pressure on teacher effort, 
as NCLB placed pressure on all schools, 
including those that made AYP in 2003, 
and attendance only represents one 
dimension of effort.
The results discussed here have at 
least three implications for education 
policy and for public-sector performance 
standards more generally. First, that 
teacher absences declined in response 
to increased accountability pressure 
suggests that one mechanism through 
which consequential accountability 
policies affect student achievement is 
through increased teacher effort. Second, 
these results contribute to the growing 
body of evidence that teacher effort, as 
measured by absences, responds to both 
school- and individual-level incentives. 
In particular, salient incentives associated 
with school-level academic performance 
can alter individual teacher behaviors. 
Finally, the heterogeneity in teachers’ 
responses to the threat of sanctions 
suggests potential benefi ts to policy 
designs and teacher training programs 
that account for such differences. For 
example, to the extent that teachers in 
tested and nontested grades responded 
differently to the threat of sanctions, 
NOTE: 95% confi dence intervals, which are robust to clustering at the school level, are reported.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from the North Carolina Education Research Data 
Center.
Figure 1  Event-Study Estimates, 1997–2004
















Employment Research APRIL 2015
standard labor economic theory suggests 
that if jobs in tested grades are more 
stressful, such jobs can pay compensating 
differentials. The differentials need not be 
monetary and could instead be provided 
in the form of additional planning 
periods, teaching aids, mentorship, or 
professional development. Similarly, that 
the increase in effort was particularly 
strong among more effective teachers 
suggests that providing additional support 
to less effective teachers may be helpful, 
particularly for teachers and schools 
subject to increased accountability 
pressure.
Notes
1. See Figlio and Loeb (2011) for a 
thorough review of such policies.
2. For example, Herrmann and Rockoff 
(2012) provide persuasive evidence that 
teacher absences in New York City’s public 
schools harmed student achievement.
3. Years refer to the spring semester of 
academic years, so 2003 refers to the 2002–
2003 academic year.
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Among the most pressing policy questions in the United 
States and other advanced economies are those concerning 
the impact of globalization: Has globalization fostered 
productivity growth and well-being in 
advanced economies? Or have the 
forces of globalization weakened 
key national industries, resulted in 
widespread worker dislocation and 
wage stagnation, and worsened 
inequality? Understanding the 
effects of globalization is critical to 
fashioning appropriate policies in 
a rapidly changing world. But this 
understanding requires good data, 
and national statistical systems 
were not designed to measure 
many of the transactions occurring in today’s global economy.
The chapters in this two-volume set identify biases and gaps 
in national statistics, examine the magnitude of the problems 
they pose, and propose solutions to address signifi cant biases 
and fi ll key data gaps. 
In addition to examining the theoretical nature of price-
index biases that have been exacerbated by the growth of 
globalization, the chapters in 
the fi rst volume estimate the 
magnitude of various biases to 
price indexes and to real output 
and productivity growth in the 
United States and other countries. 
The fi ndings point to a number 
of signifi cant concerns, and the 
authors propose concrete solutions 
to address the biases, which 
include changes in the way some 
price indexes are constructed and 
the introduction of a new price 
survey. 
The second volume extends 
the analysis to several other 
measurement issues arising from 
the growth of globalization. 
The fragmentation of production has given rise to so-called 
factoryless goods producers (FGPs): fi rms that design and 
market products but outsource the manufacturing of their 
products, often overseas. 
Pbk. 978-0-88099-488-0 $35  Cloth 978-0-88099-489-7 $55
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Student Loans and the 
Dynamics of Debt
Brad Hershbein and Kevin Hollenbeck, Editors
Student loans are instrumental in broadening access 
to postsecondary educational opportunities. For many 
individuals who want to develop their own human capital 
but who otherwise do not have the means, loans serve as 
an important supplement to governmental or institutional 
grants in making educational 
investments affordable and increasing 
the educational attainment of the 
population. The availability of 
student loans thus has great value for 
individual students and the country as 
a whole.
However, the burgeoning volume 
of debt and repayment diffi culties 
that many people now experience 
have created a vigorous debate on 
whether public policy should further intervene in student 
loan transactions. In economic terms, do the benefi ts exceed 
the costs? As with many public policy issues, answering that 
question is not straightforward. Close examination of the data 
on cumulative debt, number and characteristics of borrowers, 
types of institutions, and repayment dynamics raises almost 
as many questions as it answers. 
This volume includes the 
papers that were presented at a 
conference, held in Ann Arbor 
at the University of Michigan 
in October 2013. The Spencer 
Foundation and the Education 
Policy Initiative at the University 
of Michigan Ford School of 
Public Policy cosponsored the 
event.
The papers presented there and 
included in this volume represent 
the most current research 
and knowledge about student 
loans and repayment. This 
volume will serve as a valuable 
reference for researchers and 
policymakers who seek a deeper 
understanding of how, why, and which students borrow for 
their postsecondary education; how this borrowing may 
affect later decisions; and what measures can help borrowers 
repay their loans successfully.





“Revisiting the Promise and Problems of 
Inner City Economic Development”
An inner city economic summit featuring 
new research, discussion, and practicioner 
experiences on inner city growth, 
development, and competitiveness.
Featured keynote speaker: Michael Porter
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